### Group Assignments

**Japan Prolif Impact:**

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Max Abramson

Duvall Adair

Kavya Chaturvedi

Allie Cho

Neg Team:

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**North Korean War Impact:**

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Jennifer Luo

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**Taiwan Impact:**

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Jonah Schloss   
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Aff Team:

Ezra Serrins   
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Arjun Srinivasan

**ECS Impact:**

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Alice Viera   
Zach Vlessing   
Allegro Wang

Aff Team:

Jerry Wang

Maggie Wells   
Harris Wilson

### North Korea Exercise

Negative team should gather 6 cards to answer NK 1AC.

--Two 1NC Cards

--Four 2NC Cards

After posting, 2AC will deliver 30 second speech answering the 1NC.

2NC will deliver 2:00 minute speech extending the 1NC arguments/answering 2AC.

### North Korea War Impact 1AC

#### North Korea is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal now—this risks a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula…

Tong Kim, 6-22-2016, (a fellow at the Institute of Korean-American Studies, "To prevent nuclear war,” [http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon /2016/06/167\_207326.html](http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon%20/2016/06/167_207326.html), Accessed 7/16/2016, elk)

As Seoul and Washington stopped talking about dialogue with Pyongyang, some security experts are talking about the worst-case scenario: a nuclear war that could breakout on the Korean peninsula. North Korea continues advancing its nuclear and missile programs, while some call for Seoul's own nuclear armament. Discussions of a nuclear war are taking place at a time when the Obama administration is distracted from its foreign policy in an election year, and the Park government is crippled by a defeat in recent parliamentary elections. Both administrations are resorting to the dubious efficacy of sanctions on North Korea, hoping that pressure would somehow lead to denuclearization. Unlike during the Cold War, when a nuclear war was considered unthinkable and the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) effectively reined in decision makers from going to nuclear war, the possibility of fighting a nuclear war has become a serious topic for discussion. In the past two weeks, three research organizations released their respective updated assessment of Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal, discussing the conditions for its use, its inherent threats to the security of South Korea and the United States, and the option of a military solution. David Albright, founder of The Institute of Science and International Security, released a well-documented report on June 16, estimating that Pyongyang now has 13 to 21 nuclear weapons. Prior to the publication of this report, a widely accepted estimate was 10 to 16 bombs. In April 2015, Chinese experts said the North had close to 20 bombs, while Washington experts said at the end of 2015 that the North could have 20 to 100 by 2020. On May 24, Strategic Forecasting (Stratfor), a geopolitical intelligence advisory firm in Austin, Texas, published a five-part article on how to eliminate the growing nuclear program militarily, short of using U.S. nuclear weapons. The Stratfor report suggests that the United States would have no military option left, if it waits for North Korea to perfect related technologies that the North claims it has. There is no scientific evidence yet proving that the North has a full, battle ready nuclear capability. Like many other research organizations, Stratfor believes the North Koreans are nearing the completion of nuclear and missile technologies \_ from miniaturization for putting a nuclear warhead atop a missile, to diversifying nuclear fissile materials from plutonium to uranium and tritium to produce hydrogen and thermal weapons, and completing an ICBM with atmosphere-reentry durability and target accuracy to strike the continental United States, beyond the ranges of Japan and Guam. Stratfor favors a "minimal strike", targeting only the nuclear facilities to force the North to denuclearize. This contradicts the weight of its own argument that such a "minimal strike" can escalate into a comprehensive strike. Identification of known targets on the Yongbyun nuclear complex is pretty well known. However, there is no way to target hidden nuclear bombs and delivery systems, whose locations are not identifiable with current intelligence gathering devices. Stratfor projects the types of weapons and how much of them would be required to take out the North Korean nuclear production infrastructure, as well as sites of delivery systems. According to this conceptual plan, the mission of a minimal strike would require 10 B-2 bombers and 24 F-22 tactical fighters, equipped with special ammunition such as Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), and 600 cruise missiles that can be launched from surface ships and submarines. A minimal strike is very likely to escalate to a comprehensive campaign. On June 15, Pyongyang immediately responded to the Stratfor reports, vowing to "bolster up its nuclear deterrent … to foil any slightest provocation with … merciless counter action." Pyongyang should understand that Stratfor is not a government research arm and it does not necessarily reflect the views of American military planners. Yet, it is conceivable that a U.S. strike on the North Korean nuclear infrastructure would immediately trigger a violent response with nuclear weapons from the North. The Stratfor report offers a mechanical calculation of what it would take to eliminate a North Korean nuclear capability but it certainly is not an attractive option for political decision makers, who would ultimately have to approve such a plan. It does not even discuss potential damage to life and property that it would cause. On June 13, Garth McLennan published a sobering article "Needle in a Haystack: How North Korea Could Fight a Nuclear War" on 38 North, a website forum on North Korean issues run by the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC. The author argues, "… it can no longer be assumed that nuclear weapons will never be used" and "topics of discussion related to nuclear weapons should extend beyond proliferation…" North Korea has said it would use its nukes only "when its sovereignty is threatened by invasive forces with nuclear weapons." McLennan warns, this "should hardly be taken as gospel" ― there is no clear definition of ambiguous terms as "sovereignty" and "hostile." He also talks about the inherent usability of nuclear weapons by the North. It is not inconceivable that the North Korean war planners would almost certainly respond with nuclear weapons to any U.S. initiated, limited or comprehensive, strike, as suggested by Stratfor. If the North would mix a few nuclear warheads with conventional missile and artillery systems for a counterattack, there is no way, even with deployment of the THAAD system, to defend the South. Most major wars fought during the last century were triggered by wrong decisions, miscalculation, and misunderstanding. Few wars justify the victims and damage they have inflicted. Nobody wants war. There still is time and opportunity for all sides to prevent a nuclear war, and work for a peaceful resolution of differences. What's your take?

#### North Korea is planning to win a limited nuclear war against the US.

Nicholas Eberstadt, 2/15/2016 (American Enterprise Institute, “Wishful thinking has prevented effective threat reduction in North Korea,” <https://www.aei.org/publication/seeing-north-korea/>, Accessed 7/17/2016, rwg)

But with apologies to Clausewitz, diplomacy is merely war by other means for Pyongyang. And for the dynasty that the onetime anti-Japanese guerrilla fighter Kim Il Sung established, policy and war are inseparable — this is why the DPRK is the most militarized society on the planet. This is also why the answer to the unification question that so preoccupies the North Korean leadership appears to entail meticulous and incessant preparations, already under way for decades, to fight and win a limited nuclear war against the United States. To almost any Western reader, the notion that North Korea might actually be planning to stare down the U.S. in some future nuclear face-off will sound preposterous if not outright insane. Yet remember: As we already know from press reports, North Korea has been diligently working on everything that would be required for such a confrontation — miniaturization of nuclear warheads, intercontinental (as well as submarine-launched) ballistic missiles, even cyberwarfare (remember the Sony hacking episode?). Note further that while the North Korean leadership may be highly tolerant of casualties (on the part of others, that is), it most assuredly is not suicidal itself. Quite the contrary: Its acute interest in self-preservation is demonstrated prima facie by the fact of its very survival some 25 years and more after the demise of the USSR and Eastern European Communism. It would be unwise of us to presume that only one of the two forces arrayed along the DMZ is capable of thinking about what it would take to deter the other in a time of crisis on the peninsula.

#### Kim’s unpredictably risks provocations on the peninsula.

Kang Seung-woo, 1/7/2016 (staff writer, “Unpredictable Kim scarier than H-bomb,” <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/01/116_194924.html>, Accessed 7/17/2016, rwg)

North Korea's surprise nuclear test on Wednesday has shown that its young leader Kim Jong-un is the world's most unpredictable dictator and far more enigmatic than his father, analysts said Thursday. They say that Kim's predecessors showed consistency in their pursuit of strategies, but the isolated incumbent leader is entirely unpredictable, posing a graver security threat for South Korea and the international community as a whole. Unlike in the past, the secretive state did not inform China and the United States that it was due to conduct a hydrogen bomb test, for the first time in its history. Moreover, the young leader stabbed the South and the international community in the back with the test after hinting at a conciliatory mood on the Korean Peninsula in his New Year speech. Analysts said that regardless as to whether the device the North detonated is an H-bomb or an atomic bomb, the latest nuclear test underlined the gravity of the threats resulting from Kim's unpredictability and underscored the need to overhaul the North Korean policy fundamentally. "Kim has taken bolder and more ill-considered moves than expected, so it is too difficult to figure out Kim's plans," said Chang Yong-seok, a senior researcher at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University. "We need to reanalyze Kim's every move in the past." He also said that Kim's moves are very different to those of Kim Jong-il, the late former leader of the North and Kim's father. "As for the peace treaty agreed between the North and the U.S., for example, the elder Kim tried to pave the way for this before making strategic proposals to Washington. However, the younger Kim's leadership just made suggestions and if these are rejected, he pushes the button on a nuclear test," Chang said. An Chan-il, the head of the World North Korea Research Center, said, "The unexpected nuclear test proved Kim's unpredictability that has become increasingly worried about in the international community." The analysts said that Kim's unpredictable governing style adds to unease about security on the Korean Peninsula. "Under a scenario that the two Koreas stand face-to-face across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), Kim may order military provocations such as the Aug. 4 landmine attack," Chang said. The blast from the landmine seriously injured two South Korean soldiers.

#### A war on the Korean peninsula threatens extinction.

Peter Hayes, & Michael Hamel-Green, 2009 (Honorary Professor, Center for International Security Studies & professor in social sciences in the College of Arts at Victoria University Melbourne) The Path Not Taken, The Way Still Open: Denuclearizing The Korean Peninsula And Northeast Asia, Dec. 14, 2009. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from http://apjjf.org/-Peter-Hayes/3267/article.html

The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

### East China Sea Exercise

Negative team should gather 6 cards to answer East China Sea 1AC

--Two 1NC Cards

--Four 2NC Cards

After posting, 2AC will deliver 30 second speech answering the 1NC.

2NC will deliver 2:00 minute speech extending the 1NC arguments/answering 2AC.

### East China Sea Impact 1AC

#### China will initiate conflict – decimates US-Japan relations

White, 14

Hugh, is professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. His book The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power was published in the US last year by Oxford University Press. , 2014 (“A Great War in the East China Sea: Why China and Japan Could Fight,” The National Interest, July 15, 2014, Accessible Online at: <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/great-war-the-east-china-sea-why-china-japan-could-fight-10877>, Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)

Few people believe that either China or Japan would deliberately start a war in the East China Sea. Most analysts assume that an armed clash could only occur through accident, misunderstanding or unauthorized acts by junior officers acting without, or even against, orders. These are not remote possibilities, of course. They already make the risk of war dangerously high. But we underestimate how high that risk really is if we think this is the only way a war could begin. I think there is a real possibility that fighting might be started deliberately by one side or the other, and unless we understand the circumstances that might prompt that step from either side, we will not be able to take steps to avoid them. First, we must be clear that neither side is at all likely to deliberately start a fight over possession of the disputed islands themselves, or even of the resources that might lie around them. They are not worth a military conflict to anyone. But the dispute has never been about territory. The islands are simply tokens in a contest to define the roles and status of Asia’s great powers over coming decades. These are issues over which states might well choose to start a war. Let’s start with China. As I have argued elsewhere, China’s primary aim is to strengthen its leadership in Asia and undermine America’s. The best way to do that without confronting America too directly is to weaken the alliances and partnerships that underpin U.S. regional leadership. It therefore wants to persuade U.S. allies that Washington is no longer willing to stand up for them against the growing power of China. (Whether Beijing would be right to assume that without U.S. support they would more willingly accept Chinese leadership is a separate question, of course. As far as Japan is concerned, I think they are probably wrong, but that is a separate issue.) Beijing has clearly decided that the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute provides a perfect opportunity to demonstrate America’s wavering commitment to its allies. So far, they seem to have been right. China’s threatening military actions around the islands have stoked Japanese anxieties about whether, in the event of a clash, America would provide military support. Washington has done exactly as Beijing hoped, by sending distinctly mixed messages about what it might do in a crisis. This has indeed undermined Japanese confidence in the alliance. The risk here is that China might decide to take this approach one step further. Clearly, all of Japan’s fears would be realized, and the U.S.-Japanese alliance would be dealt a much more serious blow if a clash actually occurred around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and America did indeed fail to come to Japan’s aid. There must be a big temptation for Beijing to put America’s position in Asia to this much sterner test, in the hope that it will crack. Of course, that would only be a temptation if Beijing was very confident that Washington would indeed let Japan down. I think Beijing probably is quite confident of that, because they assume that Washington recognizes that America could not win an East China Sea conflict, and would be deterred from starting one for fear that it would escalate toward a nuclear exchange (I have explained this reasoning here). But Beijing must know that a really determined U.S. president might have the nerve to stare them down anyway. That gives Beijing a motive to move sooner rather than later in testing U.S. resolve. They have a motive to bring on a clash with Japan—perhaps by deliberately staging an “accidental” exchange of fire—while there is someone in the White House who they think will not have that kind of nerve. Someone like President Obama. Obama’s reluctance to engage in Libya, Syria, Ukraine and Iraq and the evident ambivalence about the much-hyped “pivot” to Asia may encourage Beijing to think that Obama’s presidency offers them a window of opportunity that will close after the next election if the new president is bolder—or more reckless. If so, China’s leaders might be tempted to stage an incident against Japan while Obama is still in the White House. The obvious way to reduce this risk is for the president to state clearly that America would support Japan militarily in any clash over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which is exactly what Obama said in Tokyo in late April. If a statement like this carries real credibility, it should deter Beijing from starting a clash. But if not—if it looks like a bluff or a rash statement made without careful consideration of what a war with China might mean—then China might expect that Obama would back down if put to the test. That could then actually encourage China to stage a clash.

#### Japan could unilaterally escalate

White, 14

Hugh, is professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. His book The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power was published in the US last year by Oxford University Press. , 2014 (“A Great War in the East China Sea: Why China and Japan Could Fight,” The National Interest, July 15, 2014, Accessible Online at: <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/great-war-the-east-china-sea-why-china-japan-could-fight-10877>, Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)

What about Japan? Is there any risk that Tokyo might decide deliberately to start an armed clash with China? On the face of it this seems a much less likely possibility, but it cannot be dismissed completely. Japan’s leaders might decide that their interests would be served by bringing on a clash and settling the question of U.S. commitment to Japan’s security once and for all. They could well think that time is not on their side. After all, if they are worried today that America might not be willing to confront China on their behalf, how much less confident can they be about what would happen if they clashed with China five or ten years from now? That might lead them to think that it would be better to bring a conflict on now, hoping that Washington would step forward with a robust military response which would force China to back off and drop its challenge to U.S. leadership in Asia, while restoring Japanese confidence in America’s security guarantees. Students of history will see some echoes here of the thinking which brought Japan to Pearl Harbour in 1941. Of course, Japan’s leaders would recognize the real possibility that America would fail a test of its commitment. But they might think Japan would be better off knowing now that America will not protect them from China, rather than remaining uncertain. It is not hard to imagine Japanese leaders like Shinzo Abe concluding that if Japan must in the future stand on its own against China without U.S. support, the sooner this becomes clear, the better. And the sooner Japan can start to take the necessary steps to defend itself independently, the better.

#### Goes nuclear – China’s young leadership never lived through the cold war and take nuke escalation lightly.

White, 14

Hugh, professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. His book The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power was published in the US last year by Oxford University Press. , 2014 (“Asia's Nightmare Scenario: A War in the East China Sea Over the Senkakus,” The National Interest, July 5, 2014, Accessible Online at: <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/asias-nightmare-scenario-war-the-east-china-sea-over-the-10805?page=2>, Accessed 7/1/16, DSF)

At the top of this ladder of escalation looms the possibility of an intercontinental nuclear exchange, which would, or at least should, weigh heavily on both side’s calculations right from the start. During the Cold War, the possibility of a large-scale nuclear exchange affected the calculations of the superpowers whenever there was a risk of even the smallest-scale skirmishes between their forces. That was because each superpower recognized how hard it would be to contain an escalating conflict before it reached the nuclear level, because they both saw the danger that neither of them would back down and accept defeat even to avoid a nuclear exchange. War was avoided because both sides understood that their opponents were as grimly resolved as they were.

#### Tensions go nuclear – it’s a question of resolve and China wins.

White, 14

Hugh, professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. His book The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power was published in the US last year by Oxford University Press. , 2014 (“Asia's Nightmare Scenario: A War in the East China Sea Over the Senkakus,” The National Interest, July 5, 2014, Accessible Online at: <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/asias-nightmare-scenario-war-the-east-china-sea-over-the-10805?page=2>, Accessed 7/1/16, DSF)

Can we say the same of America and China today? There has perhaps been a tendency among American strategists to overlook the importance of the nuclear dimension of any US-China conflict. They underestimate the significance of China’s nuclear forces because they are so much smaller than the Soviet’s were during the Cold War, or than America’s are today. But that does not make negligible. They can still destroy American cities, and kill millions of Americans, and it would be a desperate gamble to try to destroy them with a disarming first strike. That means we have to pay a lot of attention to the question of China’s resolve. China of course faces huge risks from America’s much greater forces, but its strategists may well calculate that on balance the nuclear factor favors China, because it plays to what they may see as China’s decisive advantage over the US in an East China Sea scenario: the balance of resolve. Let me explain. When two adversaries are relatively evenly balanced in their ability to hurt one another, the advantages lies with the one with greater resolve. More precisely, in the contest of wills that drives any escalating conflict, the advantage lies with the side that can persuade its opponent that it has the greater resolve, and will thus not step back and accept defeat before the escalating conflict has cost the other side more than it is willing to pay. If one side is confident that the other believes it has more resolve, that side will be confident that the other will back off first, and will thus be more willing to enter a conflict, and more willing to escalate it. If the operational balance is as I have suggested here, then this is the situation Washington would face in a conflict with China in support of Japan over the Senkakus. The outcome would depend on the balance of resolve. It would only be wise for America to enter a conflict with China if Washington was confident both that Beijing was less resolved to win than they were, and that Beijing understood this. Only then could Washington be confident that Beijing would accept defeat before the conflict had escalated right out of control, and cost America more than the objectives at stake were worth. So which side has the greater resolve? Is America more committed to preserving the primacy it has enjoyed in Asia for over a century than China is to restore the primacy it enjoyed for centuries before that? I think the answer is probably no. We cannot assume that China is any less determined to change the Asian order than America is to preserve it. Nor can we simply assume that China’s leaders would be too nervous about domestic stability in China to allow a conflict with the US to escalate. On the contrary, public option might well stop Beijing from retreating just as much as US opinion would stop Washington – and probably more so. Ultimately it is a simple question of geography. What happens in Asia, and the waters around Asia, really matters to China, just the way what happens in the Caribbean really matters to America. If we assume that America cares more about the Caribbean than China, we should equally accept that China cares more about the Western Pacific that America. And most importantly, this is probably the way China sees the balance of resolve. That makes China a very dangerous adversary.

### Taiwan Exercise

Negative team should gather 6 cards to answer Taiwan 1AC

--Two 1NC Cards

--Four 2NC Cards

After posting, 2AC will deliver 30 second speech answering the 1NC.

2NC will deliver 2:00 minute speech extending the 1NC arguments/answering 2AC.

### Taiwan Impact

#### Contention One: Nuclear War

#### First, China is hardening its position on Taiwan. This risks a major crisis.

White 15 — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2015 (“The harsh reality that Taiwan faces,” *The Straits Times*, April 15th, Available Online at http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-harsh-reality-that-taiwan-faces, Accessed 06-25-2016)

It is time to start worrying about Taiwan again.

In the past few years, it has slipped quietly into the background as tensions in the East China Sea and South China Sea have posed more urgent threats to regional peace and stability. But now old questions about Taiwan's longer-term future are re-emerging, and so are old fears that differences over Taiwan could rupture United States-China relations and drive Asia into a major crisis.

Taiwan's status has been a highly sensitive issue between Washington and Beijing ever since 1949, when defeated nationalists withdrew to the island as the communists swept to power in the mainland. The differences were papered over only when US-China relations were opened up after 1972. Taiwan was left in an awkward limbo, neither accepting Beijing's rule nor seeking recognition as an independent country.

Beijing has never wavered in its determination to bring Taiwan eventually under its rule, while America's Taiwan Relations Act enshrines its commitment to support Taiwan in resisting pressure from Beijing to reunify.

In the 1990s, after Taiwan became a vigorous democracy, presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian started to push the boundaries of this status quo, seeking a more normal place for Taiwan in the international community. This infuriated Beijing and escalated tensions between China and America.

These tensions eased when, in 2003, then US President George W. Bush made it clear that the US would not support any Taiwanese push to change the status quo.

After President Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008, he stepped back from his predecessors' challenge to the status quo, and instead sought to build relations with Beijing, especially by encouraging commercial ties, which have led to the two sides of the Taiwan Strait becoming deeply intertwined economically.

And China was happy to replace sticks with carrots in dealing with Taipei, apparently expecting that economic integration would eventually pave the way to political reunification, perhaps under the "one country, two systems" formula that Beijing applies to Hong Kong.

But that hope received a severe blow just a year ago, when Mr Ma's plans for closer economic links with the mainland sparked massive "Sunflower" demonstrations in Taipei by mainly young people who feared that economic entanglement would lead inexorably to precisely the political reunification that Beijing so clearly wants and expects. Then late last year, Mr Ma's policy of ever-closer economic relations suffered further repudiation by voters in a crucial round of municipal elections.

It is now widely expected that when Mr Ma's term as president ends next year, he will be replaced by a new leader who will be less accommodating to Beijing. While few expect that any future leader from either the Kuomintang or the Democratic Progressive Party will return to policies as provocative to China as those of Mr Lee or Mr Chen, the new leader will almost certainly be more assertive than Mr Ma has been.

That naturally alarms Beijing, and there is a risk that it will respond by taking a tougher line, looking for new ways to pressure Taipei into accepting the mainland's authority.

China's new leadership under President Xi Jinping seems increasingly impatient to resolve what it sees as the last vestige of China's centuries of humiliation and increasingly confident of its growing power to act with impunity. Already there are signs that its stance on Taiwan is hardening.

#### Second, the risk of war will continue to increase because of Chinese military modernization.

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” *International Security*, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)

None of the above dangers is new, but others are. China's improved military capabilities may increase its willingness both to start and to escalate a Taiwan crisis. Fifteen years ago, China had little capability to invade or blockade Taiwan. Today it can begin to imagine successfully invading Taiwan, and its capability will only increase with time.63 Much of the concern about China's so-called antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy focuses on its ability to reduce the U.S. ability to come to Taiwan's aid.64 In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their survivability and their ability to retaliate following a large U.S. counter-nuclear attack.65 Arguably, the United States' current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position in a severe crisis or conventional war over Taiwan. Consequently, China's nuclear modernization may make China more willing to start a crisis, less willing to make compromises once conflict occurs, and more willing to escalate.

#### Third, political pressure in China will continue to grow — the CCP will be forced to act aggressively toward Taiwan.

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” *International Security*, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)

A common counterpoint to the argument above is that China-Taiwan relations have improved dramatically since 2008, so the probability of war is low.66 This, in turn, means the expected benefits offered by policies that would keep the United States out of a China-Taiwan conflict have decreased. Although this argument has merit, it is hard to be confident that cross-strait relations will remain good. Taiwan might again elect a more pro-independence government, or China might ramp up pressures for unification. Jia Qingguo, a professor at Peking University, recently wrote: “[P]olitical pressures on the Chinese government when it comes to Taiwan are tremendous and growing. In the past, the Chinese people knew that China was weak and could not stop the United States from selling weapons to Taiwan. Now, many believe that China should no longer tolerate such insulting behavior. Confronted with this mounting domestic pressure, the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] is finding it increasingly difficult to justify its weak responses.”67

#### Fourth, tensions are already rising because Taiwan’s new government refuses to accept the ‘92 consensus.

Reuters 16 — Reuters, 2016 (“China says has stopped communication mechanism with Taiwan,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, June 26th, Available Online at <http://www.smh.com.au/world/china-says-has-stopped-communication-mechanism-with-taiwan-20160626-gps230.html>, Accessed 06-29-2016)

The Chinese government said on Saturday it had stopped a communication mechanism with Taiwan because of the refusal of the self-ruled island's new government to recognise the "one China" principle, in the latest show of tension between the two.

China, which regards Taiwan as wayward province, is deeply suspicious of Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, who took office last month, as they suspect she will push for formal independence.

Tsai, who heads the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, says she wants to maintain the status quo with China and is committed to ensuring peace.

But China has insisted she recognise something called the "1992 consensus" reached between China's Communists and Taiwan's then-ruling Nationalists, under which both agreed there is only one China, with each having their own interpretation of what that means.

In a brief statement carried by the official Xinhua news agency, China's Taiwan Affairs Office said that since May 20, when Tsai took office, Taiwan has not affirmed this consensus.

"Because the Taiwan side has not acknowledged the 1992 consensus, this joint political basis for showing the one China principle, the cross Taiwan Strait contact and communication mechanism has already stopped," spokesman An Fengshan said.

#### Fifth, any crisis over Taiwan will escalate quickly — nuclear war is likely.

Littlefield and Lowther 15 — Alex Littlefield, Assistant Professor in the Department of International Trade at Feng Chia University (Taiwan), holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan), and Adam Lowther, Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, Director of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies at the Air Force Global Strike Command, former Assistant Professor of Political Science at Arkansas Tech University and Columbus State University, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Alabama, 2015 (“Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America,” *The Diplomat*, August 11th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/>, Accessed 06-25-2016)

Possible Scenario

While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan.

If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-escalation.

In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China.

It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States.

In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of China’s strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States.

China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the United States. It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood.

China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished. China’s relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically.

Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity.

Central to China’s ability to guarantee that prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately, too many Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons.

Should China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side.

China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response to remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The U.S. brought an end to the mainland’s antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits.

Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan.

China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate.

#### Sixth, the U.S. will be drawn-in *in every scenario*.

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” *International Security*, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)

The most direct benefit of ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would be a reduction in the probability of war between the United States and China over Taiwan's status. Current U.S. policy is designed to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States will find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan no matter what the source of a Chinese attack. Whether Taiwan provoked an attack might be unclear, which would increase pressure for U.S. involvement. Moreover, the United States has limited control over Taiwan's policy, which puts it in the unfortunate position of being hostage to decisions made in Taipei.

#### Seventh, this guarantees escalation to full-scale nuclear war.

White 15 — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2015 (“The harsh reality that Taiwan faces,” *The Straits Times*, April 15th, Available Online at http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-harsh-reality-that-taiwan-faces, Accessed 06-25-2016)

Even more worryingly, this reality does not yet seem to have sunk in in Washington, where leaders still talk boldly about their willingness to stand by Taiwan without seriously considering what that might mean in practice. Any US effort to support Taiwan militarily against China would be almost certain to escalate into a full-scale US-China war and quite possibly a nuclear exchange. That would be a disaster for everyone, including, of course, the people of Taiwan itself — far worse than reunification, in fact.

#### Eighth, *deterrence* and *interdependence* fail — even a conventional response from the U.S. triggers counterforce fears and nuclear escalation.

Talmadge 16 — Caitlin Talmadge, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Member of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at The George Washington University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2016 (“Preventing Nuclear Escalation in U.S.–China Conflict,” Policy Brief — U.S.-China Nuclear Project, February, Available Online at <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/china_policy_brief_talmadge_0.pdf>, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 2)

The Dangers of Nuclear Escalation in the Event of U.S.–China Conflict

Five factors suggest that a U.S.–China conventional war could activate this escalatory mechanism.

First, the United States embraces highly offensive conventional concepts of operations in the Pacific, despite the nuclear pressures these approaches might place on China. A U.S. campaign in a conventional war with China could target Chinese submarines, missile sites, command and control systems, air defense networks, and other sites well inside the Chinese mainland. From China’s perspective these assets may be relevant to China’s assured retaliation capability. Thus what the United States may view as a purely conventional operation might look to China like the prelude to a counterforce strike, creating strong use-or-lose pressures. Indeed, some Chinese statements indicate that conventional attacks on China’s nuclear capabilities could vitiate China’s no-first-use pledge.

Second, U.S. alliance commitments could further exacerbate this danger. The Pacific Ocean may insulate the United States from much of China’s striking power, but U.S. allies, particularly Japan and Taiwan, would be much more militarily and economically exposed in the event of a U.S.–China war. Even if the United States believed it could achieve security through a slower and more limited conventional campaign, U.S. allies might not share that conviction. This reality again suggests that U.S. conventional operations could quickly expand in ways that could appear to impinge on Chinese nuclear capabilities.

Third, the U.S. military’s organizational tendencies also tilt in the direction of a more conventionally aggressive campaign. For understandable reasons, militaries have a well-developed general preference for the offense. Militaries also tend to pursue tactical and operational advantages at the expense of broader strategic and political objectives. Historically this behavior has resulted in a U.S. approach that is very good at general deterrence (preventing the outbreak of war) but less adept at intra-war deterrence (that is, preventing ongoing wars from escalating).

Fourth, civilian control of the U.S. military is unlikely to check these tendencies. Some civilian policymakers may not be fully aware of the potentially escalatory implications of such approaches, while others may actually embrace these approaches. The historical record suggests that civilian oversight of conventional operations with nuclear implications has not always been robust.

Fifth, situational awareness is likely to deteriorate rapidly for the United States and especially China during a conventional conflict, in ways that further compound all of the escalatory pressures just discussed. After all, denying China knowledge of the battle space through the destruction of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets (ISR) and command and control networks is likely to be one of the primary objectives of any U.S. military strategy. These sorts of attacks will be essential to U.S. conventional success but also will make it increasingly difficult for China to feel confident that U.S. aims are limited and that China’s nuclear retaliatory capabilities remain intact. Similarly, the United States may cross Chinese nuclear tripwires without realizing it.

#### Ninth, *mismatched perceptions* make nuclear escalation extremely likely. The risk is high — impact defense is wrong.

Kulacki 16 — Gregory Kulacki, China Project Manager in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, former Associate Professor of Government at Green Mountain College, former Director of External Studies at Pitzer College, former Director of Academic Programs in China for the Council on International Educational Exchange, holds a Ph.D. in Political Theory from the University of Maryland-College Park, holds graduate certificates in Chinese Economic History and International Politics at Fudan University (Shanghai), 2016 (“The Risk of Nuclear War with China: A Troubling Lack of Urgency,” Union of Concerned Scientists, May, Available Online at <http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/05/Nuclear-War-with-China.pdf>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

No Technical Exit

As long as both sides remain committed to pursuing technical solutions to their unique strategic problems, they are condemned to continue competing indefinitely. But stalemate is not a stable outcome; rather, it is a perpetual high-wire act. Twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year, the governments of the United States and China are a few poor decisions away from starting a war that could escalate rapidly and end in a nuclear exchange.

Lack of mutual trust and a growing sense that their differences may be irreconcilable incline both governments to continue looking for military solutions—for new means of coercion that help them feel more secure. Establishing the trust needed to have confidence in diplomatic resolutions to the disagreements, animosities, and suspicions that have troubled leaders of the United States and the PRC for almost 70 years is extremely difficult when both governments take every new effort to up the technological ante as an act of bad faith.

The bilateral dialogues on strategic stability aim to manage the military competition, but they do not seek to end it. Although the two governments work very hard at avoiding conflict, they have yet to find a way out of what Graham Allison called their “Thucydides trap”—the risk of conflict between a rising power and an established power invested in the status quo (Allison 2015). Allison’s warning not to minimize the risks of war is sage advice, even if he does not say how the United States and China can escape the trap he describes. [end page 8]

PRC leaders believe it is possible to prosecute a major war without risking a U.S. nuclear attack. The leaders of the United States believe stopping the PRC from prosecuting such a war may depend, in certain contingencies, on a credible threat to use nuclear weapons—a threat U.S. leaders state they are prepared to execute. These mismatched perceptions increase both the possibility of war and the likelihood it will result in the use of nuclear weapons.

Well-informed U.S. officials tend to dismiss the possibility that the United States and the PRC could wander into a nuclear war. For example, Admiral Dennis Blair, a former Director of National Intelligence whose final military post was Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, assured a large gathering of U.S. arms-control experts that “the chances of a nuclear exchange between the United States and China are somewhere between nil and zero.” J. Stapleton Roy, a former U.S. ambassador to the PRC, wholeheartedly agreed (Swaine, Blair, and Roy 2015). Similarly, PRC military strategists and arms control experts believe that the risk of nuclear war with the United States is not an urgent concern even if that risk may not be zero (Cunningham and Fravel 2015).

This lack of urgency is troubling. For example, the United States reportedly told the PRC it would risk military escalation to prevent or stop a proposed PRC island reclamation project in the Scarborough Shoal (Cooper and Douglas 2016). The PRC reportedly responded by committing to move ahead with the project later in 2016 (Chan 2016). This particular contest of wills is part of a steadily increasing number of unresolved diplomatic spats that have escalated to the level of overt military posturing reminiscent of U.S.-Soviet jousting during the Cold War.

The United States and the PRC are decades-old enemies, preparing for war and armed with nuclear weapons. Good faith efforts by the leaders of both nations have failed to stop accelerating preparations for war, including new investments in their nuclear forces. Miscommunication, misunderstanding, or poor judgment could spark a conflict that both governments may find difficult to stop.

War between the United States and the People’s Republic of China is not inevitable, but failing to acknowledge the risks is certain to make it more likely. Both governments should confront these risks with a greater sense of purpose. Only then will they devote the same measure of creativity, effort, and resources to the diplomacy of reducing those risks as they now spend preparing for war.

### Japan Prolif Exercise

2AC will prepare 45 seconds worth of answers to Japan Prolif. Focus exclusively on the impact.

2NC will have 2:00 minutes to answer 2AC.

1AR will have 1:00 minute to extend 2AC arguments.

### Japan Prolif DA

#### Strengthened US-China engagement creates a perception of weakened commitment to Japan causing them to nuclearize, which creates an Asian arms race.

Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin, 2/19/2009 (Emma, Specialist in Asian Affairs, and Mary Beth, Analyst in Nonproliferation, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests” Accessed 6/22/16 <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf> JJH)

U.S. Security Commitment

Perhaps the single most important factor to date in dissuading Tokyo from developing a nuclear arsenal is the U.S. guarantee to protect Japan’s security. Since the threat of nuclear attack developed during the Cold War, Japan has been included under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella,” although some ambiguity exists about whether the United States is committed to respond with nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear attack on Japan.25 U.S. officials have hinted that it would: following North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in Tokyo, said, “ ... the United States has the will and the capability to meet the full range, and I underscore full range, of its deterrent and security commitments to Japan.”26 Most policymakers in Japan continue to emphasize that strengthening the alliance as well as shared conventional capabilities is more sound strategy than pursuing an independent nuclear capability.27 During the Cold War, the threat of mutually assured destruction to the United States and the Soviet Union created a sort of perverse stability in international politics; Japan, as the major Pacific front of the U.S. containment strategy, felt confident in U.S. extended deterrence. Although the United States has reiterated its commitment to defend Japan, the strategic stakes have changed, leading some in Japan to question the American pledge. Some in Japan are nervous that if the United States develops a closer relationship with China, the gap between Tokyo’s and Washington’s security perspectives will grow and further weaken the U.S. commitment.28 These critics also point to what they perceive as the soft negotiating position on North Korea’s denuclearization in the Six-Party Talks as further evidence that the United States does not share Japan’s strategic perspective.29 A weakening of the bilateral alliance may strengthen the hand of those that want to explore the possibility of Japan developing its own deterrence. Despite these concerns, many long-time observers assert that the alliance is fundamentally sound from years of cooperation and strong defense ties throughout even the rocky trade wars of the 1980s. Perhaps more importantly, China’s rising stature likely means that the United States will want to keep its military presence in the region in place, and Japan is the major readiness platform for the U.S. military in East Asia. If the United States continues to see the alliance with Japan as a fundamental component of its presence in the Pacific, U.S. leaders may need to continue to not only restate the U.S. commitment to defend Japan, but to engage in high-level consultation with Japanese leaders in order to allay concerns of alliance drift. Disagreement exists over the value of engaging in a joint dialogue on nuclear scenarios given the sensitivity of the issue to the public and the region, with some advocating the need for such formalized discussion and others insisting on the virtue on strategic ambiguity.30 Potential for Asian Arms Race To many security experts, the most alarming possible consequence of a Japanese decision to develop nuclear weapons would be the development of a regional arms race.33 The fear is based on the belief that a nuclear-armed Japan could compel South Korea to develop its own program; encourage China to increase and/or improve its relatively small arsenal; and possibly inspire Taiwan to pursue nuclear weapons. This in turn might have spill-over effects on the already nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. The prospect—or even reality—of several nuclear states rising in a region that is already rife with historical grievances and contemporary tension could be deeply destabilizing. The counter-argument, made by some security experts, is that nuclear deterrence was stabilizing during the Cold War, and a similar nuclear balance could be achieved in Asia. However, most observers maintain that the risks outweigh potential stabilizing factors. US China Relations The course of the relationship between Beijing and Washington over the next several years is likely to have a significant impact on the nuclearization debate in Japan. If the relationship chills substantially and a Cold War-type standoff develops, there may be calls from some in the United States to reinforce the U.S. deterrent forces. Some hawkish U.S. commentators have called for Japan to be “unleashed” in order to counter China’s strength.34 Depending on the severity of the perceived threat from China, Japanese and U.S. officials could reconsider their views on Japan’s non-nuclear status. Geopolitical calculations likely would have to shift considerably for this scenario to gain currency. On the other hand, if U.S.-Sino relations become much closer, Japan may feel that it needs to develop a more independent defense posture. This is particularly true if the United States and China engaged in any bilateral strategic or nuclear consultations.35 Despite improved relations today, distrust between Beijing and Tokyo remains strong, and many in Japan’s defense community view China’s rapidly modernizing military as their primary threat.

#### East Asia Prolif leads to nuke war

Tan 15 — Andrew T.H. Tan, Used to work in King’s college in London, recently appointed as Chief Executive of the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, MA from Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 2015 (Security and Conflict in East Asia, April 14th, Available Online at <https://books.google.com/books?id=33OhCAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Security+and+Conflict+in+East+Asia&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiA3q-YqsHNAhVM0h4KHUndBboQ6AEIHjAA#v=onepage&q=east%20asia's%20arms%20race&f=false>, Accessed 06-24-2016, SP)

East Asia’s arms race leads to the classic problem of the security dilemma, in which a state that is perceived as becoming too powerful leads to counter-acquisitions by other states. This results in misperceptions, conflict spirals, heightened tensions and ultimately open conflict, thereby destroying the very security that arms are supposed to guarantee (Jervis 1976). East Asia’s sustained economic rise since the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the lack of any major conflict since has lulled many into believing that growing economic interdependence will make war unlikely in that region (Khoo 2013: 47-48). However, this is a false premise as significant historical antagonisms have remained Japan’s imperialism prior to 1945 and its failure adequately to account for its past continues to stir up strong nationalist emotions in China and South Korea. In addition, the divisions between North Korea and South Korea are as strong and intractable as ever, leading to an arms race on the Korean peninsula. The situation is compounded by the weakness or absence of regional institutions, regimes and laws that could regulate interstate relations, build trust and confidence, and otherwise put a stop to the arms race. None of the distinctive confidence- and security-building measures which were in place in Europe during the Cold War and helped to calm tensions as well as contain the arms race exist in Asia Within East Asia itself, the Six-Party Talks have focused only on the Korean issue and have not managed to stem North Korea’s open brinkmanship that in early 2013 almost brought the Korean peninsula to war again. The arms race in East Asia is dangerous owing to the increased risk of miscalculation as a result of misperception. Chinese policymakers appear to be convinced that Japan is dominated by right-wing conservatives bent on reviving militarism (Glosserman 2012). At the same time, there is also a perception within China that given its growing strength, it should now aggressively assert what it perceives to be its legitimate claims in the East and South China Seas. Thus, China’s nationalist discourse perceives that the problems about disputed territory emanate from other powers, not China (Sutter 2012). The consequences of conflict between China and Japan, on the Korean peninsula or over Taiwan, however, will not stay regional. As a key player in East Asia, the USA, which has security commitments to Japan and South Korea, residual commitments to Taiwan and troops on the ground in East Asia and in the Western pacific, will be drawn in. The problem is that any conflict in East Asia is not likely to remain conventional for long. In fact, it is likely that it would rapidly escalate into a nuclear war because three of the key players, namely China, North Korea and the USA, possess nuclear weapons.